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Essai: Is Actor Network Theory Critique? 
 
 
Abstract 
In this essai we debate the extent to which Actor Network Theory (ANT) provides a 
meaningful contribution to the body of critical theories of organization. Critical 
approaches are commonly associated with a denaturalizing ontology, a reflexive 
epistemology and an anti-performative politics. In contrast, we suggest that ANT 
relies on a naturalizing ontology, an un-reflexive epistemology and a performative 
politics. This does not completely dismiss ANT as a useful approach to studying 
organizations. It does however question the contribution of ANT to developing a 
critical theory of organization. 
 
Keywords: Actor Network Theory, critical theory, organization theory. 
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Introduction 
Actor Network Theory (ANT), otherwise known as the sociology of translation, 
rejects the idea that ‘social relations’ are independent of the material and natural 
world (Latour, 2005). The contribution of ANT to organization studies lies in 
recognising that there is no such thing as a purely social actor or purely social relation 
(ibid). This contribution is significant in helping to bring the ‘missing masses’ 
(Latour, 1992) of non-human actors into the frame - an important and timely move 
given the influence of the linguistic turn in organization theory.  
 
In this essai, we would like to explore the limits of ANT as a critical theory of 
organization. Our target is not ANT as an entire body of thought. Rather, we seek to 
interrogate how ANT has been used in the field of organization studies. ANT has 
been heralded as a promising direction for developing critical theories of organization 
after the so-called ‘postmodern turn’ (Calás and Smirchich 1999). By building on 
earlier critiques of ANT in organization studies (eg. Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 
1999; MacLean and Hassard, 2004), we argue that while ANT provides a valuable 
framework for the empirical analysis of the organizing process, it cannot provide a 
critical account of organization. To do this we draw on the long running debate about 
‘critique’ in organizations studies (eg. Benson, 1977; Stablein and Nord, 1985; 
Alvesson and Willmott, 1992; Fouriner and Grey, 1999; Thompson, 2004; Grey and 
Willmott, 2005).  
 
Notwithstanding the significant differences in the debate about ‘criticality’, some 
common themes connect the range of theories that generally attract the label ‘critical’. 
According to Fournier and Grey (1999), these include a commitment to ontological 
denaturalisation, the pursuit of epistemological reflexivity and a politically anti-
performative stance. First, denaturalisation involves recognising that the way things 
are is neither natural nor inevitable and therefore could be otherwise. Second, 
reflexivity involves rejecting the positivistic assumption that reality exists ‘out there’ 
waiting to be captured by the researcher in favour of recognising the role of the 
analyst in the construction of knowledge. Finally, an anti-performative stance 
involves moving beyond the sort of means-end rationality that reinforces existing 
power relations towards considering possibilities for new forms of social order.  
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Using Fournier and Grey’s (1999) framework as a sensitizing heuristic, our aim is to 
examine the ontological, epistemological and political assumptions that underpin 
ANT. We argue that ANT is underpinned by ontological realism, epistemological 
positivism and political conservatism. This means that ANT can provide us with a 
realist account of the stabilization of networks of human and non-human actors, based 
on a positive theory of knowledge, and explain how power relations are constructed. 
While these features offer an important contribution to understanding the process of 
organizing, we suggest they make ANT less well-equipped for pursuing a critical 
account of organizations - that is, one which recognises the unfolding nature of 
reality, considers the limits of knowledge and seeks to challenge structures of 
domination. By enumerating these limitations, our intention if not to dismiss ANT but 
rather to invite scholars of organization to use ANT in a more focused and reflexive 
fashion. 
 
Actor-Networks and Organizations 
Organizations, according to ANT, are understood as networks of heterogeneous actors 
- social, technical, textual, naturally occurring etc - brought together into more or less 
stable associations or alliances (Law, 1991). The term ‘actor’ can therefore be used to 
refer to a person, a plant, a machine, a weather system or a germ. ANT’s commitment 
to ‘radical symmetry’ involves viewing the power of humans and non-humans as 
equally uncertain, ambiguous and disputable (Callon, 1986). No agential priority is 
accorded to the institutional, conceptual, natural or material (Callon and Latour, 
1992). A machine can therefore be thought of as having, in principle, the same degree 
of agency as a person. For example, ANT has been used to analyse how a workplace 
safety regime is constructed through connections between bureaucratic rules, concrete 
mixers, workers and inspectors (Gherardi and Nicolini, 2000). Law (1986) calls this 
process heterogeneous engineering. A heterogeneous engineer in a science laboratory, 
for example, brings together a complex of funding, research articles, scientific 
equipment, tables, diagrams, charts, research assistants and scientific allies to form a 
successful research programme (Latour, 1987).  
 
The parallel between the notion of ‘heterogeneous engineering’ and the concept of 
‘organizing’ makes ANT an understandably attractive theory for scholars of 
management and organization. Indeed, ANT helps us to understand how relationships 
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can be organized and stabilized to create a durable and robust network (Callon, 1991). 
For instance, a new manufacturing system works as long as the employees continue to 
‘buy in’, the technical system continues to operate smoothly and the paperwork 
continues to flow (Harrisson and Laberge, 2002). However, the actor-network is only 
stable so long as all human and non-human actors remain faithful to the network. 
When employees in a manufacturing system withdraw their efforts, for example, the 
bureaucratic and technical systems begin to clog up (ibid). To ensure actors remain 
enrolled in a network, heterogeneous engineers seek to ‘black box’ existing networks 
(Latour, 1987) by stabilizing (albeit provisionally) the translation, closing 
controversies and making the cost of alternatives too high (Latour and Woolgar, 
1986). For example, a product becomes ‘black-boxed’ when it moves from being a 
prototype involving a shifting coalition of actors to being an ‘off the shelf’ product 
that is too difficult and costly to modify. According to Latour (1987, 1991), these 
‘immutable mobiles’ enable the forms of control-at-a-distance necessary for large-
scale organization, whether in 16th century Portuguese navigation (Law, 1986) or a 
modern multi-national corporation. 
 
The appeal of ANT to the organization studies community has resulted in a growing 
body of studies that use ANT to understand phenomena as diverse as professionalism 
(Dent, 2003), technology (Joerges and Czarniawska, 1998; Munir and Jones, 2004), 
information technology implementation (Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 1994; 
Bloomfield, 1995; Doorewaar and Van Bijsterveld, 2001), anomalies (Bloomfield and 
Vurdubakis, 1999), consultancy (Bloomfield and Best, 1992; Legge, 2002), 
communities of practice (Fox, 2000), organizational safety (Gherardi and Nicolini, 
2000), knowledge management (Hull, 1999), innovation (Harrisson and Laberge, 
2002), economic markets (Callon and Muniesa, 2005), corporate greening (Newton, 
2002), academic communities (Hardy, Phillips and Clegg, 2001), power (Clegg, 
1989) and organizing in general (Czarniawska and Hernes, 2005). While this body of 
work is by no means homogenous and various readings of ANT exist within 
organization studies and elsewhere, the explosion of ANT-inspired studies makes it 
both timely and fitting to re-assess the contribution of ANT to the study of 
organization. We do this by analysing the ontological, epistemological and political 
underpinnings of ANT. 
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Ontology 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) is widely valued for its apparently anti-essentialist or 
relativist ontology (Lee and Hassard, 1999). ANT seeks to resist explanations that 
appeal to the essential characteristics of actors, such as technologies (Harrison and 
Laberge, 2002) or publications (Hardy, Phillips and Clegg, 2001), by exploring how 
phenomena such as ‘environmental crises’ (Newton, 2002), or a ‘safe workplace’ 
(Gherardi and Nicolini, 2000) are produced through networks of artefacts, people and 
institutions. The aim is to de-naturalise these phenomena by viewing them as 
continually made and remade as opposed to existing ‘out there’ with inherent 
properties and characteristics.  
 
Despite this avowed anti-essentialism, ANT in fact continues to rely upon the notion 
of inherent agential capacities when attributing properties to natural and material 
objects. For example, Grint and Woolgar (1997) expose the technological essentialism 
in Callon’s (1986a) actor-network account of the French electric vehicle project. In 
attributing the breakdown of the network (at least in part) to the failure of a catalyst 
within the fuel cells, Callon thereby ascribes inherent properties to the catalyst. 
Similarly, studies of the financial markets seem to attribute major industry changes to 
technical inventions such as the stock-market ‘ticker’ or electronic trading systems 
(Callon and Muniesa, 2005). ANT therefore relies on the idea that natural objects and 
man-made artefacts have certain ‘real’ properties that explain the relative durability or 
weakness of the network (Mutch, 2002). This leaves ANT closer to the critical realist 
approach, where the ‘content’ (Mutch, 2002) or ‘affordances’ (Hutchby, 2001) of 
objects such as machines are allocated an explanatory role. From a critical realist 
position, essentialism allows us to identify the innate properties of an object (Miekle, 
1985, Fleetwood, 2002) that explain why objects and artefacts have certain ‘effects’.   
 
To be clear, emphasising the social construction of the material world is not to slip 
into an ‘idealist’ position that denies the existence of reality beyond our ideas about it. 
Rather, it is to recognise that attempting to determine the nature of reality is an 
undecidable and therefore unhelpful task because we do not have unmediated access 
to reality beyond our historically and culturally-based meanings and distinctions 
(Tsoukas, 2000). A common counter-argument to this position is to appeal to reality-
beyond-construction, such as when a person stumbles over a rock or bangs a fist upon 
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a table (Edwards, Ashmore and Potter, 1995). The value of anti-essentialism lies in 
exposing the consensual ‘common-sense’ that constructs the status of these arguments 
as evidence of the ‘real’ properties of objects. The table-thumper, for example, relies 
on the audience accepting that the part of the table hit represents the whole table, 
enabling instances to stand for categories (other tables and other man-made wood 
objects), and agreeing that one person’s experience is representative of a universal 
scientific ‘fact’ (ibid). For the rock-stumbler, the so-called essential properties of the 
rock are again achieved by the story in which they are narrated. What may be simply 
a ‘rock’ for the accident-prone stumbler could become re-imagined as a sedimentary 
layer for a geologist, a precious stone for a jewel miner or an ornamental pebble for a 
landscape gardener, each with their own definitions of what a rock ‘is’ and ‘does’. 
Place the same story in a different context and it is transformed from being an 
unwitting accident into a piece of slapstick entertainment deliberately crafted for the 
camera (ibid). 
 
Why, then, is this essentialism problematic for organization scholars? By attributing 
organizational outcomes to the effects of a technology, for instance, ANT is unable to 
understand how or why the ‘same’ technology can be interpreted and used in different 
ways (cf Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 1987). This requires an explanation of how 
certain meanings become attributed to objects and artefacts. This includes questions 
that ANT is not well-equipped to address, such as: Who decides what the content or 
affordances of a particular technology are? Why does one version come to dominate 
over others? How are users ‘configured’ to accept (or otherwise) the preferred reading 
(cf Woolgar, 1991; Kline and Pinch, 1996)? By reducing organizations to the effects 
of the essential properties of the non-human world, ANT hinders our ability to 
examine the stabilisation of an organization as a constructed achievement (Cordella 
and Shaikh, 2006). By forfeiting this deeper analysis, ANT is left vulnerable to 
universal statements about the characteristics of objects and artefacts that are 
abstracted from the context of their development and use. In contrast, careful 
empirical observation has the potential to reveal the multiplicity of meanings and uses 
around (seemingly) ‘the same’ artefact (Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 1987). While this 
‘healthy scepticism’ has been developed by proponents of ANT within sociology 
(Michael, 1996; Law and Singleton, 2005), actor-network studies of organization 
have yet to follow suit. This limitation is significant for organization theorists if we 
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want the analytical tools to understand how and why technological artefacts can be 
‘enacted’ in different ways in different organizational contexts (Orlikowski, 2000). 
 
As well as vowing to pursue an anti-essentialist project, proponents of ANT often 
declare their commitment to anti-dualism with regard to the traditional separation of 
human and non-human. Indeed, one of the central tenets of ANT is that it holds ‘no a 
priori distinction between the social and the technical’ (Gherardi and Nicolini, 2000: 
334). ANT’s ontological equality brings into the frame those actors traditionally left 
out of social scientific analysis, such as accountancy systems (Quattrone, 2004), water 
bottles (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996) and germs (Latour, 1988). Yet by suggesting 
that it is possible and desirable to distinguish between the human and non-human, 
albeit only for the purposes of analysis and to demonstrate their interconnection, ANT 
recreates the dualism it seeks to overcome (Callon and Law, 1997; Bloomfield and 
Vurdubakis, 1999: 627).  
 
The point missed by ANT is that the separation between human and non-human is 
neither natural nor inevitable but is instead the outcome of a ‘labour of division’ 
(Bloomfield, and Vurdubakis, 1994; Hetherington and Munro, 1997). For instance, 
we can only identify a technology because we split it off from human actors 
(Haraway, 1996). To label an activity or object ‘technical’ is to define particular 
boundaries and associated moral orders (Rachel and Woolgar, 1995). Within 
organizations, these categorisations can enact particular allocations of responsibility, 
resources and rewards (ibid). The divisions relied upon by ANT are therefore 
taxonomical conventions that accompany institutionalised patterns of categorisation 
and ordering (Foucault, 1974) as opposed to ontological boundaries between different 
categories of reality (cf Fleetwood, 2005). While on the one hand ANT stresses that 
actors do not have fixed boundaries (Callon and Law, 1997), it continues to rely on 
precisely these assumptions when partitioning of the world into, for instance, hotel 
managers and guests (people), weighty fobs and keys (material artefacts) and signs 
(texts) (Latour, 1991).  
 
By dividing the natural and material from the social, ANT is left with the impossible 
task of trying to gather evidence about the properties of non-human elements without 
involving human participants: that is, without the aid of respondents or researchers. In 
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simple terms, if artefacts do not speak for themselves (Grint and Woolgar, 1997) then 
defining the properties of an object must be a human act (Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 
1994), making the so-called ‘non-human’ realm in fact fundamentally social. The 
boundary between the human and non-human is therefore an outcome of the 
boundary-setting practices of the participants including the ANT analyst, not the stable 
starting-point of the analysis (Rachel and Woolgar, 1995). The result is that ANT 
recreates and reinforces the very dualisms it claims to deconstruct. 
 
In addition to seeking an anti-essentialist and anti-dualistic stance, ANT has also 
sought to move beyond deterministic models that trace organizational phenomena 
back to powerful individuals, social structures, hegemonic discourses or technological 
effects. Rather, ANT prefers to seek out complex patterns of causality rooted in 
connections between actors - the ‘hybrid collectif’ (Callon and Law, 1995) - as 
opposed to the individual nodes in the network (Czarniawska and Joerges, 1996). 
ANT-inspired organization theorists have tended to focus on how a robust network of 
actors is constructed and maintained. The assumption is that once an actor-network 
has become irreversible or ‘black boxed’ and the passage-points have become 
‘obligatory’, the ‘enrolled’ are unable to escape the network. For example, once a 
strong actor network is constructed around a new technology (eg. Bloomfield and 
Danieli, 1995) or management fashion (Doorewaard and van Bijsterveld, 2001), the 
possible behaviours of enrolled actors become increasingly delimited. Those 
translated by the network become functionaries or ‘intermediaries without discretion’ 
(Munro, 1999: 433), determined by their position in the network. 
 
By focusing on how actor-networks become determinate and irreversible, ANT 
studies miss the opportunity to uncover the limits to causality and recognise that 
relations of power in organizations are, as du Gay (1996) phrased it, ‘congenitally 
failing operations’. The fact that resistance has been documented in most cases of 
organizational change (eg. Prasad and Prasad, 2000) reminds us that there is always 
some aspect of the subjects’ world that is not translated by an actor network. Power 
relations are inherently fragile and never completely envelope the subject (Jones and 
Spicer, 2005). As Knights and McCabe (2000: 426-7) suggest, “power is rarely so 
exhaustive and totalising as to preclude space for resistance and almost never so 
coherent as to render resistance unnecessary or ineffective”. Indeed, power only exists 
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to the extent that resistance is possible. In ANT terms, then, we live in a world of 
‘translators’ but not in a world that is ‘translated’. ‘Centres of discretion’ can emerge 
alongside ‘centres of calculation’ (Munro, 1999). Networks, and their products, can 
be re-interpreted long after they are supposedly stabilised.  
 
It is important to note that many of the foundational ANT studies in sociology 
examined the breakdown or failure of actor networks, including Callon’s (1986) study 
of scallop fishing, Latour’s (1996) study of the electric light vehicle project and Law’s 
(2000) work on transitives. Followings these early leads, a few studies have sought to 
account for the role of resistance to existing actor networks through the formation of 
‘anti-plans’ (Tryggestad, 2005) and ‘counter-enrolment’ (Vickers and Fox, 2005). 
However, these accounts of resistance continue to attribute a significant degree of 
intentionality and rationality to the ‘anti-planners’ and ‘counter-enrollers’. This 
renders it difficult to account for a) actions that disrupt the network but are not 
responses to any translation process, b) resistance that is aimed at disrupting 
translation but ineffective, and c) the unintended effects of translation. 
 
Our discussion calls into question the claim that ANT provides an important 
contribution to anti-realist theories of organization (Calás and Smirchich, 1999). 
Despite frequent claims that ANT is anti-essentialist, anti-dualist, and anti-
determinist, we have found that ANT actually provides an essentialist account of the 
capacity of objects and subjects, a dualist division between objects and subjects and 
has been used to construct deterministic accounts of actor networks. ANT appears to 
naturalize organizational processes by appealing to innate capacities and 
characteristics that exist independently of human interpretation, by relying on 
artificial divisions between the social and natural world and by suggesting that the 
power of well-engineered networks is total and determinate. This means ANT is 
unable to develop an account of how the capacities of actors are emergent and 
interpretively flexible, how the split between humans and non-humans is created in 
social practice and how actors escape the process of translation. Ultimately, this 
leaves ANT ill-equipped to pursue an anti-realist project of calling into question or 
‘denaturalising’ the objective nature of social reality (see also: Mutch, 1999). 
 
Epistemology 
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ANT is often positioned as an approach that embraces epistemological relativism 
(Law, 1991) and is resolutely reflexive. This is because many of the foundational 
studies sought to examine empirically how truth was produced (rather than 
discovered) in scientific work (eg. Latour, 1986). By viewing scientific truth as the 
outcome of a struggle to construct an actor network that ensures the domination of a 
particular theory, ANT departs from the positivist assumption that the scientific 
method is a value-free way of uncovering reality. Hence, ANT is often positioned as a 
reflexive approach because it rejects the claims to objectivity typical of scientists – or, 
in the case of organization studies, strategists, accountants, managers etc. Instead, 
ANT seeks to tease out understandings that actors have of their own lived reality 
(Latour, 2005) by allowing actors “to define the world in their own terms” (Latour, 
1999: 20) and seeking to “struggle against producing its own vision of the world” 
(Lee and Hassard, 1999: 398).  
 
Following these claims we would expect ANT studies to produce explanations of the 
world that resonate with those given by local actors. In contrast, most analyses 
produced by ANT fail to match the kinds of descriptions and explanations that 
members would provide themselves. For example, few fishermen would be likely to 
attribute agency to scallops (cf. Callon, 1986), few scientists would agree that their 
knowledge claims are relative (cf. Latour, 1986) and few financial analysis would be 
likely to claim that computer systems create the price of equities (cf. Callon and 
Muniesa, 2005). The gulf between the complex neologisms used by ANT and the 
terminology used by actors in the field is of course not unique to ANT. However, the 
agnosticism practiced by ANT means that it risks disregarding the cultural 
distinctions that are meaningful to members of a given social group.  
 
Whether intentional or not, ANT’s ethnocentrism (Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 1999: 
8) implies that it offers a ‘superior’ or ‘expert’ view, leaving members explanations 
regarded as either ‘naïve’ or ‘wrong’. A commitment to understanding and respecting 
emic meanings, on the other hand, would help to temper the tendency for ANT to be 
used as a ‘grand narrative’ (Lee and Brown, 1994). Indeed, scholars of organization 
would generally expect an in-depth study of an electronics factory, for instance, to 
reveal some of what the researcher understood to be the meanings and understandings 
prevalent amongst the factory workers (cf. Harrisson and Laberge, 2002). Moreover, 
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where ANT succeeds in gaining power over and above these member interpretations, 
a more reflexive analysis would treat this as an accomplishment that requires 
explanation. For example, a more rigorous commitment to reflexivity would treat all 
accounts as in principle equal, including the one produced by the analyst (Alvesson 
and Sköldberg, 2000).  
 
As well as claiming to understand social life in terms used by members, ANT offers 
itself as a way of disrupting simple correspondence models of social reality. Indeed, 
the central contribution of ANT to the sociology of science is the argument that 
scientific theories do not hold or ‘stick’ due to their correspondence with nature, as 
per the positivist tradition. Rather, theories must be made to work – through the 
construction of a robust network of faithful human and non-human actors (Latour, 
1986). However, this worthy critical suspicion does not seem to resonate with ANT 
itself, which was founded on the premise of a linear model that purports to capture the 
reality of translation (Cordella and Shaikh, 2006). For instance, Callon’s (1986) 
foundational study of scallop fishing charts the four ‘stages’ through which the actor 
network was produced. This four-stage model has then been applied, albeit in slightly 
modified forms, in an array of subsequent studies (eg. Gherardi and Nicolini, 2000; 
Hardy, Phillips and Clegg, 2001; Doorewaard and van Bijsterveld, 2001; Harrisson 
and Laberge, 2002; Legge, 2002; Munir and Jones, 2004).  
 
While Callon’s four moments may be a useful interpretation of scallop fishing, it is 
problematic to assume it can be transported wholesale into other settings such as 
academic publishing (Hardy, Phillips and Clegg, 2001), management fashions 
(Doorewaard and van Bijsterveld, 2001) or corporate greening (Newton, 2002). 
Indeed, the un-reflexive application of the four-stage model to other settings belies a 
positivistic attempt to verify the universality of Callon’s original account (Cordella 
and Shaikh, 2006). The danger is that studies of organization are reduced to a series of 
deductive tests that confirm or refute the four-stage model of translation, as opposed 
to being a process of inductive theory generation theory that is grounded in and 
emergent from the empirical data. To be clear, our argument is not that data can be 
‘theory free’. Indeed, the generalisation of empirical findings is also a widespread 
practice amongst organization scholars (including social constructionists) and can 
produce valuable insights. Our argument is rather that such theory-testing clashes with 
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ANT’s commitment to a ‘ruthlessly’ empirical approach to studying associations 
(Latour, 2004a). Subscribing to a four-stage model implies that translation is 
something that exists ‘out there’ to be captured and represented by the researcher 
(Cordella and Shaikh, 2006). An alternative approach, we suggest, is to view the four-
stage model as an analytical heuristic or sensitising concept employed by the 
researcher to make sense of complex observations, without blinding the analyst from 
the empirical complexity of each individual case. For example, translation could 
feasibly involve more than just four steps and could be ongoing, iterative, disorderly 
and disjunctive rather than a linear one-way process.  
 
In addition to claiming to engage members’ understandings and develop non-
correspondent models of reality, ANT claims to provide the analyst with ready-made 
reflexivity (Lee and Hassard, 1999) by seeking to explain how heterogeneous 
engineers produce truth through the mobilisation of networks of actors. The argument 
is that theories do not become accepted because they are ‘true’, they are ‘true’ 
because they become accepted. Indeed, ANT has been used by organization scholars 
to trace how the production of scientific truth in organisation studies is conditioned by 
the actor networks in which it is produced (eg. Hardy, Phillips and Clegg, 2001). 
However, ANT has been less willing to reflect upon its own career as a scientific 
truth. For example, the history of ANT could be read as a story of journals, courses, 
research grant, writers and reviewers becoming enrolled into a durable network. ANT 
has developed its own obligatory passage points, defended itself from rival actor 
networks and enrolled new academic fields into its network. The popularity of ANT 
within organization studies (including, one could argue, this essai itself) is testimony 
to its network-extending effects.  
 
Rather than engaging in the reflexive work of explaining how it produces scientific 
truths, ANT seems to pursue a paradoxical strategy of claiming that it speaks the truth 
by revealing what ‘actually happens’ in the production of scientific knowledge (Law, 
2003). Indeed, Latour (2005: 144) urges scholars to “just describe the state of affairs 
at hand”. Accordingly, organization scholars have used ANT to claim to reveal the 
‘true nature’ of information technology projects (Doorewaard & Bijsterveld, 2001), 
factories (Harrisson and Leberge, 2002), accounting systems (Quattrone, 2004), and 
knowledge management (Hull, 1999) for example. This ‘ontological gerrymandering’ 
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(Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985; Bloomfield and Danieli, 1995) means that ANT treats 
the truth-claims of others as relative while representing its own findings as the 
product of absolute truth. As Cordella and Shaikh (2006: 17) argue, ANT sees reality 
as “emerging out there” in comparison to the interpretive tradition of viewing reality 
as constructed through processes of interpretation, which include the analyst. The 
upshot is that ANT exercises a kind of limited reflexivity - it is reflexive about the 
truth produced by other scientific fields without extending this reflexivity to itself 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2000). A more rigorously reflexive analysis would 
recognise the possibility of multiple versions of the process of translation, without 
assuming that the researcher holds the authoritative ‘Gods eye’ view (Lee and Brown, 
1994). 
 
Despite claims to the contrary, we have argued that ANT fails to provide a thoroughly 
reflexive theory of knowledge. Proponents of ANT claim that it pursues an 
engagement with members’ local knowledge, rejects the positivistic paradigm and 
interrogates reflexively the conditions of truth. In contrast we have argued ANT relies 
on the assumption that social life can be observed objectively by scientists using 
esoteric concepts, can be understood through a process of scientific verification and 
can be explained without a reflexive examination of the philosophical and political 
assumptions that accompany the researcher. While this positivism is not problematic 
per se, it is problematic insofar as scholars of organization might assume that to adopt 
ANT is to adopt a ‘ready-made’ reflexive epistemology. We have suggested that ANT 
tends to impose its own theoretical lexicon, attempts to verify and generalise a linear 
model and engages in limited reflexivity about its own claims to truth. What this 
means for the field of organization studies is that ANT is unable to provide a 
thoroughly reflexive account of how, as field of knowledge, it is implicated in the 
production of power/knowledge relationships.  
 
Politics 
Alongside claims to having a denaturalizing ontology and a reflexive epistemology, 
ANT often claims that it pushes forward a radical account of power by recognising 
the inherently political nature of the most mundane, taken-for-granted and technical 
decisions (Callon, 1986; Clegg, 1989). For example, ANT studies have shown how 
apparently objective issues such as scientific truth are the product of ongoing 
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negotiation and politicking designed to advance the interests of the network-builder 
(eg. Latour, 1986; Hardy, Phillips and Clegg, 2001). This has led proponents to claim 
that ANT provides a radical approach to organizational politics that rejects the idea 
that existing power relationships are natural and just and thereby opens up spaces for 
seeing and doing things differently. 
 
One of ANT’s founding principles was to propose a radical equity of human and non-
human actors. The principle of generalised symmetry asserts that the concept of 
‘actor’ should also be extended to non-human actors, such as technological artefacts. 
This has profound implications for how we conceive of and enact political action. It 
means asking questions such as: Who are the representatives of non-human actors? 
What political rights do non-human actors have? What might a parliament of things 
look like? (see: Latour, 2004). While this attempt to invite non-humans into the polis 
is a worthy gesture, it runs the risk of displacing the defining human characteristics of 
the polis as a space of meaningful, purposeful, self-aware and non-repetitive action 
(Mutch, 2002).  
 
Hannah Arendt (1958) argues that political action is fundamentally non-routine 
because it involves attempting to bring into being new relations between people. This 
stands in contrast to the kind of repetitive action characteristic of non-human actors 
like an automatic door closer (Latour, 1988a), an accounting system (Quattrone 
2004), or a concrete mixer (Gherardi and Nicolini 2000). To describe the functional 
repetition of a material mechanism as ‘agency’ is more the outcome of ANT’s 
‘anthropomorphisation’ (the attribution of human desires and intentions) than a 
reflection of the action itself. Furthermore, functional repetition of this kind has a 
tendency to bolster rather than challenge established political structures. By claiming 
that the repetitive action of an automated system is of the same status as political 
action, ANT degrades our understanding of action by obscuring the fact that it is only 
through the intervention of humans that agency - and thus political transformation of 
social arrangements - can occur. In fact, it is questionable whether acts that do not 
challenge and question our daily activity actually deserve the name ‘action’. For 
organization scholars in particular, it seems dangerous as well as difficult to attribute 
the same degree of agency to a door closer and humans in the struggle against 
institutionalised systems of capitalist domination. 
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 By collapsing human and non-human action, ANT also misses the meaningful 
character of human action (Munir and Jones, 2004: 570). Collins and Yearly (1992) 
suggest that humans deserve an ontologically distinct category for their ability to use 
language and other symbolic forms to generate and interpret meaning. This in turn 
limits the potential of ANT to contribute to our understanding of sense-making, 
interpretation and narrative (Weick, 1995, Czarniawska, 1997) – key themes in 
organization studies. It also means that ANT cannot account for how and why the 
strategies used to enrol actors tend to differ (Amsterdamska, 1990). For example, why 
are microbes unlikely to be convinced by the arguments used to enrol funding bodies 
into the scientist’s network, and vice versa? As such, ANT misses the point that the 
domain of politics is properly reserved for human relations and lacks the conceptual 
tools to understand how systems of domination might be resisted. 
 
In addition to claiming to provide a radical equalization of agency, ANT also claims 
to provide a radical account of power. In place of a single dominant social group, 
ANT claims that power operates in and through a heterogeneous network of people 
and things (Latour, 2005). For instance, corporate environmental management is 
understood to occur through the development of a network of technologies, texts, 
people and institutions (Newton, 2002). Despite the assertion that power is a function 
of networks rather than actors, the politicians at the centre of most ANT studies are 
usually portrayed as human agents with a single motive: to rationally pursue their 
self-interests by building durable networks that bolster their power. For instance, 
senior managers are seen to enrol various actors to ensure their favoured technological 
innovation is adopted (Harrisson and Laberge, 2002). Actors are hereby presumed to 
advance their interests in a Machiavellian manner through the formation of strong 
alliances (Amsterdamska, 1990).  
 
While this kind of rational interest-seeking motive may be an accurate description in 
some cases, it misses the opportunity to understand action that does not fit this 
description. Such Machiavellian assumptions not only leave ANT with an overly 
rationalistic and cynical understanding of the human actor (Laurier and Philo, 1999) 
but also incorporate a form of ‘ontological gerrymandering’ (Woolgar and Pawluch, 
1985) about the concepts of interests and motives. For example, Hassard, Law and 
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Lee (1999) claim that the central motivation for enrollers is to “ensure that 
participants adhere to the enroller’s interests rather than their own” (p. 388). Thus 
while the enroller is assumed to have a single motive (to construct a durable network) 
and inherent interests (furthered by the construction of the network), the enrolled are 
understood to have their interests constructed or ‘translated’ as they come to see their 
situation in terms that allies them into the network.  
 
According to this logic, the enroller possesses essential interests, following the 
humanistic tradition, while the enrolled have their interests translated, in the 
constructivist tradition. In our view, this is both contradictory and inadequate because 
it ignores the critical tradition in social science that has interrogated the nature of so-
called ‘interests’ and ‘motives’. First, as Willmott (2003: 86) argues, interests can be 
seen as “recurrently constructed and partially pursued, rather than affirmed and 
realised as a predetermined, essential destiny”. Second, as Scott and Lyman (1968) 
argue, motives are not an inherent driver of action but rather can be seen as a form of 
moral storytelling used to anticipate and deflect questioned conduct. In other words, 
ANT tends to presume rather than problematize what motivates an action and what 
purpose the action serves. This leaves ANT unable to pursue a more ‘critical’ agenda 
that moves beyond the assumption that actors possess ‘real’ interests (along with the 
assumption that actors’ own understandings are merely the expression of ‘false 
consciousness’) or ‘definite’ motives. A more critical approach could, for instance, 
expose the power at work in the construction of interests, desire and subjectivity 
(Knights and Willmott, 1989) or reveal the interactional ‘work’ that is accomplished 
by the imputation or avowal of motives (Scott and Lyman, 1968). It would also enable 
us to understand action that appears to be self-defeating, altruistic or even unrelated to 
any conception of interests. 
 
As well as providing a radicalization of politics and introducing new conceptions of 
the actor, some more recent variants of ANT seek to provide a normative political 
position by suggesting that the non-human should be brought into the sphere of 
political deliberation (Latour, 2004a). This, it is argued, would mean a more equal 
distribution of political rights, opportunities and voice. However, by producing 
descriptions of existing networks of actors in an apparently neutral, apolitical manner, 
ANT actually reinforces the state of affairs that it describes. Indeed, Law (2003) 
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recognises the possibility that ANT simply reproduces rather than challenges the 
hegemony of the networks they describe. For organization studies, this makes ANT 
ill-suited to the task of developing political alternatives to the imaginaries of market 
managerialism (Parker, 2002).  
 
Three further concerns arise from ANT’s limited version of politics. First, the focus 
on translation brings a bias towards the ‘victors’, which further marginalises the 
voices of those who find themselves excluded from networks (Leigh-Star, 1991, Lee 
and Brown, 1994). Second, opting for a flat ontology means that ANT ignores the 
hierarchical distribution of opportunity (Reed, 1997). The power to translate, it seems, 
is not evenly distributed. Third, by reducing ‘right’ to ‘might’, ANT remains 
indifferent about the specific means through which power is established 
(Amsterdamska, 1990). For instance, coercion, corruption and intimidation are not 
distinguished on any normative basis from persuasion, negotiation and reward. 
 
To sum up, our discussion of the political underpinning of ANT questions the 
assertion that ANT provides a ‘radical’ political framework. ANT claims to provide a 
unique normative position by encompassing the non-human realm and a critical 
stance that exposes the power and politics underlying actor-networks. However, we 
have argued that ANT actually degrades the meaning of political action by elevating 
the status of non-human actors, reduces meaningful action to utility maximisation and 
evades a commitment to emancipation, however local and small-scale. The upshot is 
that ANT brings with it a tendency to legitimise hegemonic power relations, ignore 
relations of oppression and sidestep any normative assessment of existing 
organizational forms. For scholars of organization, then, ANT is limited to the 
description of surface-level power relations (Winner, 1993) without the ammunition 
both to construct other possibilities and empower actors to pursue them. 
 
Conclusion 
We started this essai by asking what the limitations of ANT might be for developing a 
critical theory of organization. We noted that ANT claims to provide an ontologically 
relativist, epistemologically reflexive and politically radical account of organization. 
Our discussion has suggested that ANT actually tends towards an ontologically 
realist, epistemologically positivist and politically conservative account of organizing. 
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For proponents of ANT, the reply to this argument might be ‘so what?’ We would 
therefore like to conclude this essai by arguing that these philosophical underpinnings 
have important implications for what ANT can (and cannot) do for organization 
studies. 
 
ANT’s commitment to realism, positivism and conservatism makes it valuable for the 
task of conducting detailed empirical studies of organization. Yet these commitments, 
we suggest, make ANT poorly equipped to address some of the key questions that 
would enable a critical account of organization. In fact, Bruno Latour (2004a, 2005) 
has more recently attempted to distance ANT from the idea of critique by arguing that 
critical theory should be abandoned in favour of the production of detailed 
descriptions. In his recent ‘introduction to actor-network-theory’, Latour (2005) 
argues that ANT is first and foremost a call for close empirical study of associations: 
‘If I were you, I would abstain from frameworks altogether. Just describe the state of 
affairs at hand’ (Latour, 2005: 144).  
 
In this essai, we have argued that the use of ANT in organization studies fails to 
contribute to the development of critical approaches to organization. Despite claims to 
the contrary, we have shown that ANT relies on a naturalizing ontology. This departs 
from the principle that radical thought must seek to denaturalize social reality. We 
have also seen that ANT relies on a predominantly un-reflexive epistemology. This 
departs from the radical principle of being sceptical about claims to knowledge, 
including claims made by the researcher. Finally, we have argued that ANT relies on 
a conservative politics. This departs from the radical principle of anti-performative 
politics aimed at emancipatory social change, however local and small-scale (Stablein 
and Nord, 1985, Alvesson and Willmott, 1992). Thus, at least according to Fournier 
and Grey’s (1999) definition, ANT falls short of contributing to critical approaches to 
organization studies.  
 
The criteria constructed by Fournier and Grey (1999) and elaborated in this essai are 
of course not definitive and also not without their problems (see eg. Thompson et al, 
2000, Thompson, 2004). The relativist approach to epistemology/ontology and the 
critical/emancipatory approach towards politics in particular generate clear tensions. 
Indeed, these tensions represent an ongoing feature of debates within ‘critical’ 
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approaches and are elucidated most clearly in the debate between Parker (1999) and 
Thompson et al (2000). How can knowledge and reality be doubted while claims are 
made about the reality of organizational inequalities and injustices? Can relativism be 
reconciled with concrete plans for alternative arrangements that offer a ‘better’ way of 
organizing? Do constructionist and postmodern approaches reduce all voices to mere 
examples of discourse and lead to moral nihilism? Should we avoid ‘performative’ 
engagement or actively seek to construct organizations in a different way? Our aim 
here is not suggest an alternative grand, all-encompassing theory. If these tensions 
represent “the burden borne by all critical theorizing” (Knights and Vurdubakis, 1994: 
192), they can serve positively to spark a reflexive commitment to resisting excessive 
claims to emancipation (ibid). We therefore use the critical agenda put forward by 
Fournier and Grey (1999) not as a final and complete taxonomy for the evaluation of 
‘criticality’, but as a way of scrutinising the assumption that ANT offers a promising 
avenue for the pursuit of a critical theory of organizations. 
 
To sum up, our argument is not that ANT should be rejected per se. ANT is clearly a 
useful method for understanding how actors are enrolled, how truth claims are 
constructed and how objects and artefacts enable organized action. Our aim is not to 
discourage the adoption of ANT in organization studies but rather to encourage those 
using ANT to be clear about the ontological, epistemology and political commitments 
it brings with it. This point is particularly important if ANT is to be used in a ‘pick 
and mix’ fashion and combined freely with others, such as Foucauldian theory (see 
for example Newton, 1996; Fox, 2000). Our discussion has shown that these theories 
may not be as philosophically and politically compatible as first thought. In 
conclusion, we invite those members of the organization studies communities 
interested in developing a critical theory of organization to resist translation by Actor 
Network Theory. 
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